OccupyGhana® Calls For A Stop On Physical Attacks On Journalists And For The Prosecution Of Offenders

OccupyGhana® Calls For A Stop On Physical Attacks On Journalists And For The Prosecution Of Offenders

9th MAY 2018



OccupyGhana® wishes to register its total abhorrence at the penchant of persons, particularly those in political authority or with political connections, to assault and batter journalists who are simply doing their work.

The recent reported assault on Ohemaa Sakyiwaa Ahwenepa, a reporter of Accra-based Adom FM by one Hajia Fati, a known member and operative of the New Patriotic Party (NPP) at that party’s headquarters in Accra is reprehensible and ought to be condemned outright. In addition, the perpetrator has to be dealt with to the fullest extent permitted by law.

OccupyGhana® is concerned that these attacks persist because of the failure, neglect or refusal to prosecute offenders. This has created a culture of impunity that has unfortunately infected and engulfed even the Ghana Police Service, when one considers the recent similarly barbaric, senseless and un-called for attacks on another journalist, Iddrissu Latif also of the Multimedia Group, while undertaking his legitimate journalistic duties.

Examples of such attacks are a legion. However, one thread that runs through them is the non-prosecution of the perpetrators. Added to this is the apparent lack of interest or inability of the victims to commence and sustain civil legal action against their assaulters and the owners of the premises where these assaults occur, particularly the political parties.

We are scandalized by the time it took the New Patriotic Party to publicly condemn the actions of Hajia Fati; and when that came, it was markedly forced, laboured and half-hearted. The NPP appears oblivious to the fact that it has a legal obligation to protect journalists and other persons who they allow into their premises to conduct legitimate business.

OccupyGhana® is heartened to learn about a report of the assault having been filed with the police. We are glad that Hajia Fati has been invited for questioning. We would encourage the Multimedia group to also commence civil proceedings against both Hajia Fati and the NPP, and to leave no stone unturned in ensuring that justice is done in this matter

In the same vein, we are demanding full disclosure from the Ghana Police Service on its investigations into the assault of Iddrissu Latif, and for the relevant consequential legal processes to take place.

These attacks on journalists must stop forthwith. An attack on journalists going about their legitimate duties is an attack on the entire Ghanaian citizenry. It must not be tolerated! The media as the ‘fourth estate of the realm’ play an integral role in the lives of the state and its peoples. Any party or group that seeks to thwart their work have no right to institutional existence under the Fourth Republican Constitution.

In service for God and Country.


The Defence Cooperation Agreement Between Ghana And The Usa – Matters Arising

The Defence Cooperation Agreement Between Ghana And The Usa – Matters Arising

9TH APRIL 2018



OccupyGhana® has followed the debate over Parliament’s ratification of the Agreement Between the Government of the United States and the Government of Ghana on Defence Cooperation, the Status of United States Forces and Access to and Use of Agreed Facilities and Areas in the Republic of Ghana (“Agreement.”)

We have noted three primary reactions to the Agreement, namely those who (i) object to the Agreement in its entirety, (ii) think that we could have obtained better terms from the United States, and (iii) do not object to the Agreement at all. OccupyGhana respects all of these views.

We would however wish to raise three key issues:

First, we appreciate the fact that this Agreement was properly sent to Parliament for ratification. This is probably only the third time in the history of the Fourth Republic that such an agreement has been sent for parliamentary ratification. The first was the 2003 Bilateral Agreement between the Ghana Government and the Government of the United States Regarding the Surrender of Offenders to the International Criminal Court. The second was the GITMO-2 Agreement, which was only sent to Parliament for ratification after litigation and an order to do so by the Supreme Court.

OccupyGhana® believes that no such agreement, if required to be ratified by Parliament, should be assumed to be confidential. While deliberations over matters of defence and national security may require confidentiality, the starting point for agreements between states, which are of the utmost public interest, should be that where such agreements are to be ratified by Parliament, they would be made available to the public. Where confidentiality is genuinely required, we should ensure that firstly, such documents are formally given the requisite status under the State Secrets Act, 1962 (Act 101), and secondly, the security classification of such agreements is specifically agreed upon in negotiations so that the state-parties to them would have a uniform and reciprocal treatment of such documents in their respective jurisdictions.

Second, with the terms of the Agreement having been made public, there was no need for Parliament to have rushed its ratification. The speed to ratify the agreement on the last day of sitting and at a time when the vast majority of Ghanaians were realizing probably for the first time that we have such agreements, was not right. Ghanaians deserved more time to debate and assimilate its terms, which would have better informed our support of or opposition to it. The night time, acrimonious ratification proceedings was unfortunate. In addition, we cannot help but express our disappointment that the Right to Information Bill has not attracted this sense of urgency from this or any Parliament.

Third, we note that the Agreement, although ratified by Parliament, will not immediately come into force. According to article 19 of the Agreement, it will only come into force when the parties to it have exchanged the required diplomatic ‘Notes.’

This third issue raises the question whether the portion(s) of the Agreement that purport to grant diplomatic status, privileges and immunities to the members of the US Military, can come into force simply with parliamentary ratification or whether a Legislative Instrument is required to be laid in and passed by Parliament before the status, privileges and immunities may be applied to members of the US military covered by the Agreement.

Ghana passed the DIPLOMATIC IMMUNITIES ACT, 1962 (ACT 148), according to section 1 of the Act, to give “the force of law” to the receiving state obligations under “[a]rticles 22, 23, 24, and 27 to 40 of the Vienna Convention (which regulate the immunities and privileges, including exemption from taxation, freedom of communication, inviolability of premises and immunity from civil and criminal jurisdiction, to be conferred upon diplomatic agents.)”

These privileges and immunities apply automatically to “diplomatic agents” (which would include military attaches) and not to any other persons or organizations, including members of visiting military forces, who are ordinarily covered by the Visiting Forces Act, 1962 (Act 117). For all such other persons or organizations, section 2 of the Diplomatic Immunities Act demands that “[t]he President may, by legislative instrument, make Regulations extending any or all of the immunities and privileges conferred on diplomatic agents by virtue of this Act to prescribed organisations and prescribed representatives and officials, subject to such conditions and limitations as may be prescribed.” This provision empowers the President to extend the status, privileges and immunities to persons other than diplomats properly so-called. However, once the President elects to exercise this power, he is bound to act by or under a Legislative Instrument, which must be placed before and passed by Parliament under Article 11 of the Constitution.

Consequently, although other portions of the Agreement may come into force in accordance with the terms of the Agreement and after parliamentary ratification, the portions of the Agreement that purport to confer diplomatic status, privileges and immunities on the US Military and its agents would require a formal Legislative Instrument prepared by the President, and which Article 11 of the Constitution requires to be laid before Parliament for passage. That instrument would specifically prescribe the US Military as an organization to which Ghana is extending these rights and may contain conditions and limitations.

Indeed, in 1957 when Ghana passed the International Bank, Fund and Finance Corporation Act, 1957 (No. 17), it provided in section 3 that a Legislative Instrument was required before the officers of the World Bank, International Monetary Fund and International Finance Corporation would have the status, privileges and immunities that were agreed upon. Similar provisions exist in section 3 of the International Development Association Act, 1960 (Act 11) and the West African Examinations Council Act, 2006 (Act 719). We would also want to draw attention to the Diplomatic Immunities Instrument, 1978 (LI 1180) which extended certain immunities and privileges to the Science Education Programme for Africa (SEPA).

We do not think that Parliament’s ratification of the Agreement under Article 75 is a substitute for the requirement to pass a Legislative Instrument under Article 11(7) of the Constitution.

It is in the light of these that we call for a draft Legislative Instrument on the status, privileges and immunities provided for under the Agreement to be prepared and then we comply with Article 11 of the Constitution to bring those into force. At the very least it will give Parliament yet another opportunity to consider the relevant and affected portions of the Agreement, and hopefully this time with more soberness and less acrimony.

In service for God and Country.


OccupyGhana® Calls For Support For The Auditor-General To Verify All Assets & Liabilities Declared By Public Officials

28TH  JANUARY 2018




OccupyGhana® believes that it is within the constitutional remit of the Auditor-General to conduct an audit or verification of all forms submitted to that office by affected public officers, purporting to declare their assets and liabilities. Such audit or verification would be to ascertain whether:

(1) the assets and liabilities were declared in accordance with the law, upon the assumption by the public officer of his office,

(2) the assets declared actually exist, so as to prevent ‘assumptive’ declarations, where the person declares non-existing assets now, based on the assumption that through corruption those assets may be acquired later,

(3) the declarations were submitted within the time provided by the Constitution, and

(4) any new assets were acquired or liabilities discharged while in office, so that an inquiry may be conducted into whether those assets or the means to settle the declared liabilities were acquired genuinely.

Such a verification or audit could cover all assets declared since the coming into force of the Constitution.

We also believe that if the audit/verification reveals contravention or non-compliance or that there are assets that are not properly attributable to the income of the office holder, then the Auditor-General may refer the matter to the Commission for Human Rights and Administrative Justice (CHRAJ) for investigation.

OccupyGhana® has also received and studied the 2017 Conduct of Public Officers Bill. While recognising that the Bill contains some forward-looking provisions on assets declaration, we notice that the Bill stops short of expressly recognising the inherent power of the Auditor-General to verify the declarations that are submitted to her/him, although that recognition is inferred in that Bill.

We nevertheless do not think that the Bill must be passed into law, or that any constitutional or legislative amendments are required, for the Auditor-General and CHRAJ to perform these functions.

We believe that it is time for the said offices to rise up to the constitutional obligations placed on them, and perform these functions that will bring life and meaning to the relevant constitutional provisions in the fight against corruption.

We now turn to a discussion of the relevant constitutional provisions.



Article 286(1) demands that holders of specified public offices “shall submit to the Auditor-General a written declaration of all property or assets owned by, or liabilities owed by him whether directly or indirectly.” The article speaks of a “declaration,” which we understand to mean a formal or explicit statement or announcement.

Currently the declaration is in the nature of a form that is found in Schedule 2 to the Public Office Holders (Declaration of Assets and Disqualification) Act, 1998 (Act 550). Our understanding of the current practice is that the Declaration Form is allegedly completed and submitted to the Auditor-General in a sealed envelope. We also understand that the envelopes remain sealed, and that the successive Auditors-General have not considered it as part of their obligations under the Constitution to open the sealed envelopes, let alone verify or conduct an audit of their contents.

We find nothing in article 286 that supports the current “secret declaration,” which is a contradiction in terms. The concept of a “secret declaration” that remain uninspected in the hands of the Auditor-General is not just alien to the Constitution but an anathema, and is therefore unconstitutional.

We also note that the power of the Auditor-General to verify the declarations submitted is implicit or implied in the language of the Conduct of Public Officers Bill. For instance, clauses 7 and 11 make it an offence to submit a false declaration or clarification, or to fail to submit a declaration or clarification. Clause 8 provides for the Auditor-General seeking clarification on matters such as the ownership of assets declared and explanation or correction of discrepancies or inconsistencies in the declarations. Clearly, these are not possible until the Auditor-General has exercised his power to verify or audit the declarations submitted to her/him.



Further, article 286 demands that the declarations should be submitted to the Auditor-General by office holders (i) before taking office, (ii) at the end of every four years, and (iii) at the end of a person’s term of office. The Constitution expresses these in mandatory terms and does not permit the making of the declaration and submission on any date after the stated times.

Therefore, it is also unconstitutional to submit any declaration to the Auditor-General after the deadline stated in the article. Any office holder who submits the declaration after the stated deadline has breached the Constitution and the oath of office to “defend the Constitution of the Republic of Ghana as by law established.”

Accordingly, we believe that the provision in section 1(4) of Public Office Holders (Declaration of Assets and Disqualification) Act, 1998 (Act 550), which gives a 6-month extension for the submission of the declaration, is unconstitutional and void. The repeat of this in clause 4(3) of the Conduct of Office Holders Bill would also be unconstitutional if the Bill is passed into law.



Article 286(3) then provides that the declaration “shall on demand be produced in evidence” before a court, a commission of inquiry under article 278 and before an investigator appointed by CHRAJ.

Since the inception of the Constitution, this provision has been applied to mean that these are the only circumstances under which the declaration may be made public. We disagree. This provision only states instances where the declaration may be tendered in evidence. It does not say that apart from these circumstances, the declaration is and remains a confidential document that even the Auditor-General can neither audit nor verify. The article surely does not bar the Auditor-General from opening the envelopes submitted to verify if indeed what has been submitted is an assets and liabilities declaration form in the first place, and then to audit the contents, cross-checking with other assets and liabilities declared previously by the same persons.

That is why any application of article 286(3) to make the declaration submitted to the Auditor-General a secret even from the Auditor-General himself/herself also flies in the face of article 286(4), which is couched in general terms and not subject to article 286(3) as follows:

“Any property or assets acquired by a public officer after the initial declaration required by clause (1) of this article and which is not reasonably attributable to income, gift, loan, inheritance or any other reasonable source shall be deemed to have been acquired in contravention of this Constitution.”

Any position that purports to bar the Auditor-General from auditing and verifying the declaration would read article 286(4) as being subject to article 286(3), so that the only circumstances under which it may be discovered that an office holder had acquired assets or settled liabilities in breach of the Constitution, is when the declaration is “produced in evidence” in the course of court proceedings, commission of inquiry proceedings or CHRAJ investigations.

Our respectful view is that it is the Auditor-General’s audit or verification that would reveal whether any new assets have been acquired or liabilities settled. It is that audit that would inform the commencement of any of the article 286(3) proceedings at which the actual declaration submitted to the Auditor-General would be “produced in evidence.”

The current stance therefore flies in the face of the probity, accountability and transparency provisions in the preamble to the Constitution, negates the mandatory obligation placed on the state under article 35(8) “to eradicate corrupt practice,” and claws back the duty placed on citizens to “to protect and preserve public property and expose and combat misuse and waste of public funds and property.”



We reiterate that it is not for nothing that the Constitution provides that the assets and liabilities declarations be submitted to the Auditor-General, and no other person. In line with the residual auditing function of that office under the Constitution, we find it hard to believe that the declarations submitted remain unopened and are simply filed away. Without the Auditor-General conducting such audits and verification, the spirit and true intent of article 286 will never be achieved and the current “concealment and archiving” process will be used to defeat the article.

It is on these bases that we have concluded that the only way to give voice and flesh to article 286 is for the Auditor-General to verify and audit declarations that are submitted, or at least a sample of them. That audit will reveal to the office (i) whether a person has truly declared all assets and liabilities upon assumption of office, and (ii) when a person had completed service to the nation, whether that person has acquired any new assets or settled any liabilities so that an inquiry may be had into whether those assets were acquired genuinely.

We call on the Auditor-General to outline a verification procedure which reflects the true and proper interpretation of the Constitution, particularly article 286, in line with the above, and implement it forthwith. Yours in the service of God and Country,


OccupyGhana® Calls For The Existing Television Licence Regime To Be Repealed And Replaced

OccupyGhana® Calls For The Existing Television Licence Regime To Be Repealed And Replaced

4th JANUARY 2018



OccupyGhana® has followed the recent discussions regarding TV Licence Fees, particularly the announcement that specific courts have been established to try defaulters. We disagree with these moves for two reasons:

  1. There is no constitutional or statutory basis for the Ghana Broadcasting Corporation (GBC), simply as the designated “licensing authority,” retaining the revenue from what is essentially a tax, and then determining how to use it, outside laws passed and appropriations made by Parliament, and
  2. The entire TV Licence regime that was established in 1966 (with just a few amendments) has become obsolete. What is required is not a forcible re-implementation of it, but a root-and-stem review that repeals the existing law and regime, and, if necessary, introduces a new statute and regime that takes the current realities in broadcasting into account.

We will address these matters in turn:


The Television Licensing Act, 1966 (NLCD 89) and the various Television Licensing Regulations passed under it, provide for the payment of TV Licence Fees for the licensing of the installation and use of “television receiving sets.” These are to exist and operate under the auspices of a “licensing authority” that would be either “the Ghana Broadcasting Corporation or any other statutory corporation appointed by the Minister by legislative instrument.” Every contravention of the Act (including the non-payment of the fee) is an offence punishable by up to a fine of 250 penalty units (GHS3,000) and/or up to one year’s imprisonment.

The TV Licence Fee is simply a tax for owning or dealing in the affected apparatus. GBC is merely the currently designated body to administer the licences and collect those taxes, as an agent of the government. We are not aware of any statute that gives GBC the power to retain the revenue derived from the tax and then use it for its operations, developing content, sharing with other broadcasters or for any other purpose.

That tax revenue is also not listed as one of the sources of funds of the GBC under section 10 of the Ghana Broadcasting Corporation Act, 1968 (NLCD 226). Although that section provides that GBC’s funds include “moneys accruing to the Corporation in the course of the performance of its functions,” tax revenue does not accrue to the GBC and does not fall under this rubric. Similarly, if the Minister were to designate another statutory corporation as the “licensing authority” under the Act, that entity would not have the right to use the revenue.

Further, that revenue does not constitute GBC’s “internally generated funds” (IGF). Article 176 of the Constitution demands that “all revenues or other monies raised or received for the purposes of, or on behalf of, the Government;” and “any other monies raised or received in trust for, or on behalf of, the Government,” must be mandatorily paid into the Consolidated Fund. Exceptions, particularly retentions, are only permitted under an Act of Parliament.

That is why statutes such as the Ministries, Departments and Agencies (Retention of Funds) Act, 2007 (Act 735) and the Public Financial Management Act, 2016 (Act 921) contain strict rules on the use of IGFs, and our statute books are replete with specific statutes (too many to be listed here) in which Parliament expressly allows entities to keep all or part of IGFs. We are not aware of any such statute with respect to the GBC.

It is on these bases that we believe that the automatic retention of the TV Licence Fees by the GBC for its purposes is unconstitutional and illegal and we therefore call for that practice to cease forthwith. Absent a specific enabling legislation, all TV Licence Fees collected should be immediately deposited in the Consolidated Fund.


We further contend that both the regime and the law on TV licensing are obsolete for three main reasons:

(i) The Act defines “television receiving set” as “an apparatus CONSTRUCTED SOLELY for the reception of pictures, with or without sound transmitted by radio” [Emphasis added.] This means that if the apparatus in use, by its manufacture and technology, is not restricted to only receiving pictures (with or without radio-transmitted sound), but is capable of receiving other signals, that apparatus is not the subject of licensing and consequently the payment of the fee. We think that contrary to your expressed view, the law expressly rules out the vast majority of apparatuses (Smart TVs, phones, pads, tablets, etc.) that are currently in use, and which are manufactured to receive and process more than just pictures. Indeed what may even be called “TVs” today are not mere linear broadcast receivers and translators of pictures. They are also used to play games, watch movies, project presentations, display location adverts and browse the Internet. The reality is that a strict application of a law that is based on 1966 technology, to 2017 apparatuses would leave the licensing authority with precious little or almost nothing to enforce the licence against.

(ii) With over authorized 505 radio stations (392 operational) and 75 television stations, Ghanaians have a lot of media sources to consume both local/public and international content. This ensures competition that should result in producing quality content. Also, Ghana has recorded a tremendous growth in the number and diversity of media channels, with Ghanaians having countless media sources such as radio, newspaper, magazines, websites and other online platforms. Further, online platforms such as YouTube, Hulu, Netflix, Apple TV, Amazon Prime Video and Google ChromeCast are redefining content broadcasting online and pointing to the future of TV broadcasting. All these are available and consumed in Ghana, driving the growth of data usage. There are also cable-TV services in Ghana who broadcast local channels through set-top boxes. Some of these have become the first choice channels for media content consumption, thereby reducing the audience share for traditional TV transmission. Evidently, GBC is not the only TV media source where public information is consumed for it to warrant an automatic right to TV Licence Fees and to be able to produce and broadcast public information. Further, not all Ghanaians or TV owners in Ghana will consume GTV’s content.

(iii) GBC (managers of GTV) is a commercial broadcaster. For years, it enjoyed an absolute monopoly in television broadcasting and the income from adverts and sponsored contents. Now it has competition and is faltering. Compelling Ghanaians to pay TV Licence Fees to GBC is grossly unfair and anti-competitive. Announcing the setting up of a court for these purposes sends the wrong signal to Ghanaians, that draconian steps are being taken to use the judiciary a tool of enforcement of a grossly unpopular tax. If GBC is unable to be profitable, in spite of years of government subvention and TV Licence Fees, then it may be time to consider selling it.


In conclusion, the world of television has moved from being analogue to the digital sphere. The rules have changed. In a world of digitisation, Ghana should be thinking of laws and policies that look into the future, and seek to create the enabling smart digital environment for prosperity and opportunities for all. You cannot, in 2017, be seeking to implement laws based on obsolete and currently inapplicable 1966 technology and then seek to punish Ghanaian for not complying with it. That is why we are advocating the repeal of the 1966 law and regime, and if necessary, the enactment of new laws that take the new realities into account.

Yours in the Service of God and Country.


OccupyGhana® Demands Outline For Passage Of The Right To Information Bill




OccupyGhana® is deeply concerned that there do not appear to be any clear or discernible plans to pass the Right to Information Bill into law. Despite numerous Government assurances that the Bill will be passed “this year,” “very soon” or in the “next session” of Parliament, no clear timetable has emerged.

The inexcusably long delay by successive governments under the Fourth Republican Constitution to pass this law suggests to us that governments are simply afraid to pass a law that will help actualise a right that the Constitution has already given to Ghanaians. Unless and until the law is passed, Ghanaians are entitled to conclude that governments will seek any and every excuse to defer the passage of this law for as long as possible.

OccupyGhana® is gratified that the courts have held that the right to information does not require an Act of Parliament to be exercised. Yet there remain substantive and procedural impediments to the exercise of this right. The current ‘default’ position of government departments is to either refuse or simply not answer any request for information. This forces citizens to go to court every time they seek to exercise that right. This is unacceptable and has to be addressed to ensure a straightforward and low cost system for the public to be able to enforce requests for information.

OccupyGhana® therefore demands from the government and Parliament, a clear timetable for the passage of this law. This timetable should take cognisance of the commendable public engagement process for the Office of Special Prosecutor Bill, and set firm dates by which:

  1. the government will publish and gazette the Bill;
  2. the Bill shall be tabled for debate in Parliament and
  3. the Parliamentary Select Committee on Constitutional, Legal and Parliamentary affairs shall conclude its deliberations on the Bill.

OccupyGhana® expects that the Bill, when passed into law, will set out the clear parameters and instances where the government will exercise public interest privilege (this is the privilege that allows government to refuse the disclosure of a document or information which is against the public interest.) The current wide-bound interpretation of the government on this privilege is, in our view, the greatest substantive and procedural hurdle to the full realisation of the right to information. Any law that does not deal with this matter in a manner that eases the right to information would be worthless and not have been worth the wait.

OccupyGhana® proposes that the mechanism of a truly Independent Commissioner with the power to determine disputes over public interest privilege would be the single most straightforward means of resolving any current impasse over this issue. An Information Commissioner using a highly simplified and swift process with limited scope for hearings and procedural delays would address concerns about the conflict between public disclosure and privilege. Any disputes over the Commissioner’s determination may be resolved by the Court, on narrow grounds akin to judicial review.

In conclusion, the continued delay in passing this Bill, which is now 18 years old, cannot and should not be accepted one jot further by the Ghanaian people.

Yours, for God & Country,



7th NOVEMBER 2017




Two weeks ago, we woke up to media reports, alleging that a 4-year old girl had been sexually abused in Assin Adadientem in the Central Region. This allegedly took place on 13th October 2017. The age of the suspect, named only as “Kwabena.” varies between 17 and 18 years, depending on which source you are getting the information from. The mother of the victim is alleged to have reported the matter to the chief, who is said to have pronounced the suspect innocent on the instructions of the gods. The chief has denied this. The victim’s father is also said to have reported the case to the police. There is very little to that part of the story.

According to one article on ‘myjoyonline’, she bled profusely for days before her mother sought help. According to one report, the victim’s mother had travelled to a funeral and had left her in the care of her 8-year old sister, a report that ought to be seriously investigated. That narrative, and given the fact that the mother detected the bleeding on the 14th of October, suggests that the mother was away for at least one night. Even though the article did not specify the bleeding site, we will assume that it was from the area of the vagina, considering the circumstances.

According to another Joy FM report, Dr. Bernard Brew at the St. Francis Xavier Hospital in Assin Fosu, issued a medical report showing an intact hymen with no evidence of laceration; the vulva however was moist and appeared inflamed.  These events are not unusual when it comes to matters involving child sexual abuse. The stories are hardly ever straightforward and it takes a lot of time, patience, training and commitment to sieve through the available evidence.

We condemn without reservation sex abuse in general and Child Sex Abuse in particular. However, we also believe in being innocent until proven guilty by a competent law court. For there to be a conviction, there must be good evidence gathered by the authorities to hold up in court, and like with all evidence, the earlier collected, the better. A delay usually leads to contamination and unreliability of the evidence, if any.

The court of general opinion has already found 17 or 18-year old ‘Kwabena’ guilty. We do not have the luxury to support that position until, it has been so proved by the prosecution in a competent law court. If ‘Kwabena’ is under the age of 18 years, he would be treated as a juvenile. That would mean that this matter would fall squarely within the remit of the 2003 Juvenile Justice Act, which has very different considerations as regards offences committed by juveniles. Our hearts still go out to the little girl because she is unwell and has been admitted to hospital. This will attempt to dissect the media reports, in an attempt to make any sense of it all, but ultimately, the evidence produced in court is the most crucial.

Globally, Child Sexual Abuse (CSA) is defined as intra or extra familial contact abuse of a minor (below 18 years of age), and the victim may be female or male. What then is defilement? In Ghana, section 101 of the 1960 Criminal and Other Offences Act defines defilement as the natural or unnatural carnal knowledge of a child under sixteen years of age. In defilement, consent from the child is immaterial. What this means is that, a suspect who defiles a child under sixteen cannot say that he obtained consent from the victim therefore he is justified. Apart from having natural or unnatural carnal knowledge of a child, some children are also indecently assaulted; there is a spectrum, running from non-invasive to frank rape, and this poses a challenge.

There are varied but marked consequences on the victims, from mental, through emotional and even to their physical health. CSA is a complex, deeply rooted and very traumatizing phenomenon; the victims suffer profound disturbances in their sexual development. It leads to profound feelings of guilt, shame, low self-esteem and familial and social isolation. Globally, about 20% of girls are sexually abused as minors. Curiously, it has very little correlation with socio-economic status of the victim and the perpetrator – all are at risk. Indeed, it is commoner than childhood cancers.

Could it be related to culture? At this moment, there is no evidence to support that, because the incidence is about the same globally, with the difference being in the number of reported and prosecuted cases. Perhaps, the effect of our culture may lie in the elders, chiefs and deities deciding to adjudicate the matter, rather than allowing the law to take its course. The perpetrators are related or known to the victims in 70% of cases. We also know that this is grossly under reported because of collective and individual shame. When there is strong collective shame, there is a low tendency to disclose. It is even worse when the victim and perpetrator are related. With the combined efforts of the police Domestic Violence and Victim Support Unit (DOVVSU), social pressure groups, better education and financial independence of our women, the number of reported cases has increased. For instance, reported rape cases rose by about 10% from 2016 to 2017, whereas defilement cases reduced by about 15% over the same period.

There are a ton of publications on CSA, and most papers often address it as primarily legal as well as feminist issue. This moved the discussion away from the psychological and emotional dimensions and focused more on the direction and development of the law, and in such cases, the law tends to be identified as a significant site of contest.

This particular case, presents more questions than answers:

  1. Apart from the 8-year old sister, was there an adult child keeper?
  2. If there was such a keeper, what did she do about it before the victim’s mother returned from the funeral?
  3. From the media, the victim’s mother reported after several days of bleeding, why was that so? Was it that the child refused to talk? Was she afraid? Was the mother also afraid?
  4. Did the mother confide in another person prior to reporting the case? If she did, what did the person advise?
  5. The victim’s mother is said to have reported to the chief of the village, can this be corroborated?
  6. If she did report to the chief, what exactly did the chief advise?
  7. Did the chief say he had consulted the oracles who declared the suspect innocent?
  8. Was there another person present when the victim’s mother met the chief? We know that per our customs, there is usually a linguist at least, when the chief holds court.
  9. Has the chief been invited by the police for questioning? If he did not advise the lady to report the case, nor did not report same to the police, can we say he obstructed justice?
  10. Has the suspect been questioned by the police?
  11. Has the suspect been examined by the doctor?
  12. How authentic is the medical report doing the media rounds?
  13. Is it possible for a rape victim not to have physical clinical evidence of rape?


The successful prosecution in a normal legal system requires that there are laws that have been infringed upon and good quality evidence presented. Sadly, 90% of CSA will not have any physical clinical findings. Sometimes, the only evidence is the victim’s word, and that has many challenges; even for adults, it is not easy, so you may well imagine it for a 4-year old witness whose evidence might even require corroboration to stand up in court. The recent abuse stories involving Harvey Weinstein, the American movie producer, show that even the adults were afraid to come forward for many years.

‘The absence of the hymen does not mean CSA’.

Anatomy is not sacrosanct; there are variations of normal, and these are not abnormal. In simple language, there are tall and short people, with many shades between. Likewise, there are normal variations of the genitals. The appearance of genitalia and the hymen in particular varies with age, constitution, hormonal and the different phases of life. Tampons, riding, splits and stretches may vary the shape and size of hymen.

The perineum (the area around the vagina/penis and anus) has a rich blood supply, and this hastens tissue healing. It is important therefore, to report immediately. A few days later, and the evidence is gone. Early presentation may also allow for DNA evidence from semen, skin and hair to be collected at the hospital. It also allows for medical examination of the suspect for scratch marks, bruising of genitalia and the victim’s DNA samples on his body. It is important to examine the whole body, and not just the genital area. Most doctors may not be sufficiently trained in child and adolescent gynaecology and forensics, and are therefore, likely to miss important pieces of the jigsaw puzzle. A well-trained gynaecologist will be familiar with the challenges and the current trends in determining CSA. Unfortunately, there is a shortage of those.


DOVVSU should join hands with the gynaecologists to organize training sessions for the doctors in the front line. This will equip them with the skills to enable them pick up evidence and quickly from the history, physical examination and appropriate investigations. Again, we should look at the legal framework that will enable limited and responsible use of photography to improve evidence collection, interpretation and preservation.

Having lost so much time already, this case needs a medical board with gynaecologists, police interrogators and investigators, psychologists and forensic scientists to give it the best shot.

There is a lot of work to be done to reduce the incidence of CSA in Ghana and the rest of the world. We need the police to be professional, we need the doctors to be well equipped to gather the evidence, we must encourage people to come forward, and early and we must find a way of stopping adjudication by people who are not mandated by law so to do. Even though the state encourages out of court settlement in certain cases, that only applies to misdemeanours and not offences like CSA. It might even be prudent to consider legislation that punishes people who block such cases from coming to the authorities.

Children are not responsible enough to look after other children. That is why the 1998 Children’s Act demands that parents must “ensure that in the temporary absence of a parent, the child is cared for by a competent person.” Parents should therefore show responsibility and not leave children in the care of other children and adults in whom trust is questionable. Ghanaians must be educated on the fact that the breach of the parental care and duty provisions of the Children’s Act is an offence that could end up in the parent being fined and/or going to jail.

Further, parents should love and encourage their children to communicate with them without fear, so that the children are able to report any form of abuse. Finally, the community should not shield offenders.

What we should all realize is that, prevention is better than cure!

Yours in the service of God and Country


OccupyGhana® Condemns The Mishandling Of The Delta Force Case And The Farcical Sentences Imposed.

OccupyGhana® Condemns The Mishandling Of The Delta Force Case And The Farcical Sentences Imposed.

25th OCTOBER 2017



OccupyGhana ® has noted with grave concern, the ridiculously insignificant fines imposed on the NPP activists who either escaped from lawful custody or engaged in criminal acts under the banner of the Delta Forces.

On March 28th 2017 we issued a press statement condemning the acts of lawlessness, vandalism, violence, thuggery and assault by certain groups said to be associated with the ruling New Patriotic Party (NPP) since it took over the reins of power on January 7th 2017.

We pointed to the Flagstaff House assault on January 9th 2017 by persons alleged to be members of the NPP’s Invincible Forces, forcible takeovers of tollbooths by persons claiming NPP membership, and the March 24 attack in the Ashanti Region by persons alleged to belong to the NPP affiliate, Delta Force.

OccupyGhana® minced no words in expressing our alarm that these unlawful and criminal acts were being brazenly carried out seemingly without condemnation by the government, and in the full glare of and a seeming lack of strong, swift, forceful and decisive intervention by the state security apparatus to stop it. We unreservedly condemned the acts as illegal and unlawful and called on the government, the NPP and the state security apparatus to act to curb them.

We are not aware that anyone was punished for the Flagstaff House attack and tollbooth takeovers. That was bad. But ultimately, what has happened with respect to the acts of the so-called Delta Force leaves a bitter taste in the mouth, makes a mockery of our law enforcement institutions and ridicules our judiciary. From the botched bail hearing which was disrupted by alleged Delta Force members, through the failure of the police to provide evidence to support a prosecution leading to the filing of a nolle prosequi, and ending with the farcical fines slapped on those who escaped lawful custody and the even more farcical fines imposed for “rioting”, the notion that one can get away with impunity and even criminality if one was an activist of a ruling government has been reinforced and fortified.

That is wrong. We are shocked at how these matters have been handled and are even more appalled about the risible fines imposed on the persons found to have engaged in these criminal acts.

One would have thought that all would have learnt lessons from the Montie 3 incidents when it comes to dealing with the court. The physical attack on the circuit court in Kumasi was in our view worse than what the Montie 3 did on radio. One would have expected that the judiciary, like it did with the Montie 3, would send a strong message to all that similar conduct would not be tolerated. Unfortunately the meek fines imposed can at best be described as a stab in the back of the judiciary by the judiciary itself.

It is of little wonder that a self-proclaimed leader of the Delta Force is reported to have stated that they have no regrets for their acts. That is a sad testimony produced by the toxic mix of official complicity and judicial blessings in the imposition of those farcical fines.

It is hardly surprising that on Monday 16th October, in blatant disregard for the rule of law, the Burma Camp Youth Wing, a pro NPP youth group, attacked and chased out  the Regional Coordinator & staff of the Ghana School Feeding Programme in Tamale over perceived unfair allocation of schools in the region to caterers. The group’s chairman has since boldly defended their actions which included locking the Regional GSFP offices saying they would do whatever it takes to make the party succeed.

OccupyGhana® registers its absolute disgust at and utter condemnation of these matters.

It is not too much to demand from political parties, especially those in power, that they call their supporters and support groups to order and educate them on these matters. It is not too much for the state security apparatus, especially the Ghana Police Service to thoroughly investigate acts of thuggery (irrespective of who engages in them), and arrest the perpetrators and bring them to book. It is not too much to demand that the state deal with this fast calcifying canker firmly, immediately and decisively without delay, without favour and resist interference from every quarter. It is not too much to ask of the judiciary that as the last bastion of the rule of law and constitutional harmony, it should do more than merely slap persons who engage in such acts on the wrist.

Our regret is that what has happened will give these or like-minded people and groups increased licence to perpetrate unlawful acts, embolden others to form new groups along similar lines, increase the likelihood of reprisal attacks from rival groups and spur violence between political opponents and on citizens. If the court can be attacked in this way, who can tell how far such people will be prepared to go?

We consider these as grave threats to our national security and cohesion. Ghana cannot afford this. We call on the Attorney-General to appeal against these sentences and to give a higher court an opportunity to review the sentences imposed. That is what will send a clear message that impunity is not tolerated in Ghana. Anything short of this is wrong and unacceptable.

Yours in the service of God and Country,


OCCUPYGHANA v. Auditor-General and Attorney-General – Judgement

OCCUPYGHANA v. Auditor-General and Attorney-General – Judgement

(Unrepoprted, Supreme Court, Writ No. J1/19/2016, 14th June 2017)

Coram: Akuffo, Adinyira, Dotse, Yeboah, Baffoe-Bonnie, Gbadegbe, Bennin JJSC

JUDGMENT (Dotse, JSC read the unanimous judgment of the Court):

Article 187(7)(b)(i), (ii) and (iii) of the Constitution 1992, provides as follows:-

In the performance of his functions under this Constitution or any other law the Auditor-General… (b) may disallow any item of expenditure which is contrary to law and
(i) surcharge the amount of any expenditure disallowed upon the person responsible for incurring or authorizing the expenditure; or
(ii) any sum which has not been duly brought into account, upon the person by whom the sum ought to have been brought into account;
(iii) the amount of any loss or deficiency, upon any person by whose negligence or misconduct the loss or deficiency has been incurred.

Based on the above constitutional provisions referred to supra, the Plaintiffs claim the following reliefs against the Defendants before this court:

(1) That upon a true and proper interpretation of Article 187(7)(b)(i) of the Constitution, the Auditor-General is bound to issue a disallowance or surcharge where there has been any item of expenditure on behalf of the Government that is contrary to law, so that the amount unlawfully expended is recovered from the person who was responsible for, or authorised, the expenditure disallowed.

(2) That upon a true and proper interpretation of Article 187(7)(b)(ii) of the Constitution, the Auditor-General is bound to issue a disallowance and surcharge where any person fails to bring any sum into the Government’s account, so that that amount is recovered from the person by whom the amount should have been brought into account.

(3) That upon a true and proper interpretation of Article 187(7)(b)(iii) of the Constitution, the Auditor-General is bound to issue a disallowance and surcharge where the Government suffers or incurs a loss or deficiency through the negligence or misconduct of any person, so that the value of the loss or deficiency is recovered from that person (whether or not a public servant).

(4) That the failure, refusal or neglect by the Auditor-General to ever issue any disallowances and surcharges in respect of (i) unlawful items of expenditure, (ii) amounts not brought into account, and (iii) losses and deficiencies incurred through negligence and misconduct, as set out in successive Reports of the Auditor-General issued since the coming into force of the Constitution, are violations by the Auditor-General of his/her obligations under the Constitution and

(5) That the Auditor-General be ordered to issue disallowances and surcharges to and in respect of all persons and entities found in successive Reports of the Auditor-General to have been responsible for or to have authorised unlawful items of expenditure, not bringing sums into account, or having caused loss or deficiency through negligence or misconduct, in accordance with Article 187(7)(b) of the Constitution.


The facts relied upon by the Plaintiffs who are a pressure and advocacy group, incorporated under the laws of Ghana can briefly be summarised as follows:-

That the Auditor-General pursuant to article 187(2) of the Constitution, has been given the constitutional responsibility to audit and issue a report therein in respect of the public accounts of Ghana and of all public offices which in this instance includes the courts, the central and local government administrations, of the Universities and public institutions of like nature, of any public corporation or other body or organisations established by an Act of Parliament.

The Plaintiffs further draw attention to article 187(5) of the Constitution which enjoins the Auditor-General to carry out the audit of the public accounts within 6 months of the preceding financial year and submit a report, and “shall in that report draw attention to any irregularities in the accounts audited and to any other matter which in his opinion ought to be brought to the notice of Parliament.”

In this respect, the Plaintiffs referred to sections 20(1) and (2) of the Audit Service Act, 2000 (Act 584) and section 2 thereof in particular which provides and states in material particulars what this report to Parliament by the Auditor-General is required to draw attention to in cases in which he has observed the following:-

(a) an officer or employee of Government has willfully or negligently omitted to collect or receive any public money due to the Government;
(b) any public money was not duly accounted for and paid into the Consolidated Fund or other designated public account;
(c) an appropriation was exceeded or was applied for a purpose or in a manner not authorized by law;
(d) an expenditure was not authorized or properly vouched for or certified;
(e) there has been a deficiency through fraud, default or mistake of any person;
(f) applicable internal control and management measures are inefficient or ineffective;
(g) the use or custody of property, money, stamps, securities, equipment, stores, trust money, trust property or other assets has accrued in a manner detrimental to the state;
(h) resources have not been used with due regard to economy, efficiency and effectiveness in relation to the results attained;
(i) in the public interest, the matter should be brought to the notice of Parliament.

It has to be noted that, the above provisions of the Audit Service Act, have taken their authority from Article 187(7)(b) of the Constitution already referred to supra, which empowers the Auditor-General to disallow any item of expenditure which is contrary to law, and having done so to:

(i) surcharge the amount of any expenditure so disallowed upon the person responsible for incurring or authorizing the expenditure, or
(ii) direct that, any sum which has not been duly brought into account, be brought into account upon the person by whom the sum ought to have been brought into account, or
(iii) direct that the amount of any loss or deficiency, be brought upon any person by whose negligence or misconduct the loss or deficiency has been incurred.

In other words, the person by whose conduct of negligence or misconduct the loss or deficiency occurred must be held liable.

The Plaintiffs further asseverate that since the inception of the 4th Republican Constitution on 7th January 1993, the Auditor-General has failed, neglected and or refused to carry out his mandate in fulfillment of the constitutional obligations referred to supra, which would have entitled him to retrieve the amounts, losses and or deficiencies from the offending persons for the benefit of the good people of the Republic of Ghana. This conduct of the Auditor-General according to the Plaintiffs is a violation of his constitutional mandate and obligations under Article 187(7)(b) of the Constitution.

In pursuance of their resolve to ensure that the Auditor-General complies with the above constitutional obligations referred to supra, the Plaintiffs on 12th November 2014 addressed a letter exhibited to these proceedings as Exhibit OG3 entitled “Request for the Exercise of Auditor-General’s Powers of Disallowance and Surcharge, and Notice of Action.”

In that letter, the Plaintiffs state in part as follows:-

We have studied the Auditor-General’s Audit Reports to Parliament for the eleven (11) years between the year ended 31st December 2002 and the year ended 31st December 2012. In that period, the Auditor-General has identified a wide range of stolen and/or misappropriated funds which are due to the public purse. Nevertheless, and quite without explanation, although the Auditor-General is known to have made “recommendations”, OccupyGhana and most Ghanaians are not aware of a single instance in which a Disallowance and Surcharge has been made by the Auditor-General or any of his offices.

The Plaintiffs then requested the Auditor-General to either comply with the constitutional obligations therein stated or face a legal challenge after the expiration of 30 days from the date of the letter.

The Auditor-General responded to the said letter on 9th December, 2014 and attached written comments therein, and this is marked as Exhibit OG4 in these proceedings.

We deem it appropriate at this stage to quote in extenso the relevant portions of this Exhibit OG4 as follows:-

14. On the matter of procedural precedence under the laws of Ghana, there is an issue of timing of the exercise of discretionary power given to the Auditor-General under Article 187(7)(b) of the Constitution. Article 187(5) of the Constitution requires the Auditor-General to send this report on all irregularities (disallowance items included) to Parliament for consideration. Under section 23 of the Audit Service Act, the reports of the Auditor-General become public documents as soon as they have been presented to the Speaker to be laid before Parliament.
15. The question is, should the Auditor-General exercise his discretionary power of surcharge and start to disclose his findings through the courts for public consumption before submitting his report to Parliament or after submission to Parliament.

It would appear that, the Auditor-General clearly perceives this power of disallowance and surcharge granted him under Article 187(7)(b) of the Constitution as discretionary and this therefore meant he is not bound to apply or enforce those provisions.

In conclusion, the Auditor-General reiterated the fact that his office has since July 2013 collaborated with the office of the Attorney-General through the formation of a joint committee to enquire into cases cited in the Auditor-General’s reports spanning 2006-2011.

According to the Auditor-General as per the response in OG4 which we again refer to in extenso, “the mandate of the Committee was to review all cases in the Auditor-General’s report covering this period for further action. The result of the Committee’s work after several sittings since 2013 indicate that about 85% of the cases in the Auditor-General’s Report for the period covered, only required administrative actions by the institutions concerned because they derive from non-compliance with applicable laws, policies and procedure”

Feeling dissatisfied with the above explanations, the Plaintiffs instituted the instant action against the Attorney-General who is the nominal Defendant for and on behalf of the Auditor-General.

We must commend legal counsel for the Parties for well prepared statements of case in which they argued inter alia the following:-

(1) Whether the original jurisdiction of the court was properly invoked
(2) The powers and constitutional obligations of the Auditor-General of disallowance and surcharge under article 187 (7) of the Constitution.
(3) The Auditor-General’s narrow interpretation of his obligations under the said articles referred to supra which the Plaintiff’s consider as wrong, and
(4) The closing arguments of the Plaintiffs and Defendants in their statement of case.


The Plaintiffs concluded their arguments in the statement of case as follows:-

Your Lordships, we have attempted in these submissions to answer the further issues set out joint (sic) by the parties. We will have humbly contended that the Auditor-General does not fully meet his obligations under Article 187(7)(b) when he conducts audits and prepares reports that show financial irregularities. Those constitutional obligations to disallow and surcharge are only discharged when, upon discovering financial irregularities, the Auditor-General takes (sic) follows the deliberate statutory steps to disallow them and then surcharge the persons responsible for causing them with any amounts lost to the State. We have also respectfully argued that the Auditor-General’s obligations do not even terminate when he issues a certificate of the Disallowances and Surcharges. The law has created a bifurcated enforcement responsibility, first on the public entity with respect to which the irregularity occurred to receive payment within 60 days. When the amount surcharged is not paid, the head of that public entity has to institute civil action to recover same. However, if the person surcharged files an appeal against the Disallowance and Surcharge, the Auditor-General is made the statutory respondent to that appeal. However, even this bifurcated enforcement responsibility cannot commence or arise unless and until the Auditor-General has first performed his Disallowance and Surcharge obligations.


The Defendants on their part contended through learned Solicitor-General, Mrs. Helen Ziwu that the Auditor-General has not failed to carry out the constitutional mandate he bears by virtue of Article 187(7)(b) of the Constitution as is contended by the Plaintiffs. The Defendants further argued that the powers of discharge and disallowance vested in the Auditor-General are set out in section 17 of the Audit Service Act, 2000 (Act 584). We therefore deem it appropriate at this stage to set out in detail the provisions of this section 17 of Act 584.

17. Disallowance and surcharge by Auditor-General
(1) The Auditor-General shall specify to the appropriate head of department or institution the amount due from a person on whom a surcharge or disallowance has been made and the reasons for the surcharge or disallowance.
(2) A sum of money specified by the Auditor-General to be due from a person shall be paid by that person to the department or institution within sixty days after it has been so specified.
(3) A person aggrieved by a disallowance or surcharge made by the Auditor-General may appeal to the High Court not later than the expiration of sixty days prescribed in subsection (2).
(4) In accordance with article 187(10), the Rules of Court Committee may, by constitutional instrument, make Rules of Court for the purposes of subsection (3) of this section.
(5) A sum of money which is lawfully due under this section is recoverable, on civil proceedings taken by the head of department in a Court as a civil debt and where the person surcharged is in receipt of remuneration from the Government or an institution, the remuneration shall be attached to the extent of the sum lawfully due.

In other words the roadmap which the Auditor-General is expected to follow whenever he exercises his powers of surcharge or disallowance pursuant to Article 187(7)(b) and section 17 of Act 584 supra are the following:-

(i) The Auditor-General shall indicate to the appropriate head of department or institution the amount due from the person on whom the surcharge or disallowance has been raised and the reasons for it.
(ii) The sum of money indicated by the Auditor-General to be due from a person shall be paid by that person to the department or institution within 60 days after it has been indicated
(iii) An aggrieved person has 60 days from the date of the indication in subsection 2 supra to appeal against the discharge or surcharge made by the Auditor-General.
(iv) The Rules of Court Committee have been mandated under Article 187(10) of the Constitution to make Rules of Court for the actualization of subsection 3 of section 17 of Act 584.
(v) Any sum of money due under this section 17 is recoverable, by civil proceedings taken by the head of department in a court as a civil debt and where the person surcharged is on Government payroll, his salary or entitlements shall be attached to the extent of the sums lawfully due.

The above road map indicates quite clearly that the powers of the Auditor-General in respect of this Surcharge and Disallowance are really extensive and are intended to ensure that any monies that are lost through any of the processes mentioned in Article 187(7)(b)(i), (ii) and (iii) are recovered to the state.


The Defendants summarised their closing arguments very briefly as follows and we wish to quote them accordingly thus:

My Lords, we respectfully submit, in conclusion that the Auditor General’s obligations end when he carries out his statutory mandate as set out in section 17(1) of Act 584 and section 84 of Act 921 and in this regard, it is respectfully contended on behalf of the Defendants that the Auditor-General has from the inception of the 1992 Constitution carried out his statutory mandate of disallowance and surcharge.


The Defendants raised a jurisdictional point against the Plaintiffs writ thus:

The Plaintiff has not made out a proper case which will require this honourable court to make any declarations within the meaning of Article 2(1)(b) of the 1992 Constitution, and it is respectfully urged on this court to dismiss this action.


At the close of pleadings, the following issues were set down in the joint memorandum of issues agreed upon by the parties:

(1) Whether or not the Auditor-General fully discharges his constitutional obligation simply by auditing and pointing out financial irregularities in the accounts of a public entity.
(2) Whether or not the Auditor-General has an obligation to ensure that his powers of disallowance and surcharge duly exercised are complied with by the public entity or official directly affected by the Auditor-General’s exercise of his power of disallowance and discharge.

After the setting down of the above issues, this court by an order dated 31st January 2017 requested the parties and/or their counsel to file legal arguments in respect of the said two issues.

We observe that the parties have complied with the said orders.

On the 7th of March 2017 this court again directed that further arguments of law be filed by the parties and or counsel in respect of the issue of whether the Plaintiffs have properly invoked this court’s jurisdiction.

We observe that, this order has been complied with only by learned Counsel for the Plaintiffs, Thaddeus Sory. We will therefore proceed to deal with these issues, and since jurisdiction is primary, we will deal with that first.


It is to be noted that Articles 2(1)(a) and (b) and 130 of the Constitution deals with the original jurisdiction of the Supreme Court. Thus the Plaintiffs action in the instant case must be measured in terms of the said provisions of the Constitution.

Out of abundance of caution, these provisions provide as follows:-

2. (1) A person who alleges that
(a) an enactment or anything contained in or done under the authority of that or any other enactment; or
(b) any act or omission of any person
is inconsistent with, or is in contravention of a provision of this Constitution, may bring an action in the Supreme Court for a declaration to that effect.

130. (1) Subject to the jurisdiction of the High Court in the enforcement of the Fundamental Human Rights and Freedoms as provided in article 33 of this Constitution, the Supreme Court shall have exclusive original jurisdiction in
(a) all matters relating to the enforcement or interpretation of this Constitution; and
(b) all matters arising as to whether an enactment was made in excess of the powers conferred on Parliament or any other authority or person by law or under this Constitution.

In their closing arguments, learned counsel for the Defendants submitted that the Plaintiffs have not made a proper case to require this court exercise it’s jurisdiction in their favour, and urged the Court to dismiss the action.

Predictably, the Plaintiffs anticipated this type of jurisdictional objection and stated as follows in their original statement of case:-

From the facts so far recounted, the Plaintiff’s case falls squarely within the first ambit of the court’s original jurisdiction as classified by the court in the Edusei Case [1998-99] SCGLR 753 at pages 771-772.

What then are the principles in Edusei (No. 2) v Attorney-General referred to supra?

In that case, it was noted by Kpegah JSC that “in determining the scope or extent of this court’s original jurisdiction,” we must read together articles 2 (1) and 130 (1) of the Constitution. And in reading the two articles together, “the courts exclusive original jurisdiction can be said to be in respect of the following situations:
(1) enforcement of all provisions of the Constitution, except those provisions contained in Chapter 5 dealing with Fundamental Human Rights, or
(2) the interpretation of any provision of the Constitution; or
(3) an issue whether an enactment is inconsistent with any provision of the Constitution.”

The Plaintiffs have also filed a response in compliance with this court’s order dated 7th March 2017, on this jurisdictional issue.

The facts of the instant case, which have been extensively stated, fall into categories (i) and (ii) supra. This is because the Plaintiff’s are indeed asking this court to interprete Article 187(7)(b) of the Constitution in a certain direction such that when enforced it will have the desired results that they wish. But the Defendants contend otherwise. Meaning there are rival contentions.

In clear terms, the Plaintiffs are indeed requesting of this court to interprete the mandate given to the Auditor-General in the discharge of his constitutional duties or obligations. Thus, if this court accedes to that request and interpretation, then it will have to follow it with enforcement which will then lead to the Auditor-General issuing a disallowance and surcharge in all the three scenarios mentioned in Articles 187(7)(b)(i), (ii) and (iii) respectively of the Constitution.

We also observe that, the Plaintiffs, anchored their reliefs basically on the constitutional provisions and where necessary provided flesh by reference to the Audit Service Act, 2000 (Act 584) and Public Financial Management Act, 2016 (Act 921). The Defendants on the other hand have relied basically on the said statutory provisions and argued that this court has no jurisdiction.

We have on our part, considered in detail, the facts of this case which admit of no controversies whatsoever.

We have also considered the law and a plethora of decided cases on the subject, such as the following:-

(1) Republic v Special Tribunal, Ex-parte Akosah [1980] GLR 592 which is the locus classicus on the subject-matter
(2) National Media Commission v Attorney-General [2000] SCGLR 1
(3) Aduamoa II v Twum [2000] SCGLR 165
(4) Tuffuor v Attorney-General [1980] GLR 637 SC
(5) Bimpong Buta v General Legal Council [2003-2004] SCGLR 1200
(6) Republic v High Court (Fast Track Division) Ex-parte CHRAJ, (Richard Anane: Interested party) [2007-2008] SCGLR 213
(7) Osei Boateng v National Media Commission [2012] 2 SCGLR 1038, just to mention a few.

We deem it necessary to refer to the observation by our respected Sister, Adinyira JSC in the case of Okudzeto Ablakwa & Another v Attorney-General & Obetsebi Lamptey [2011] 2 SCGLR 986 wherein she stated as follows:-

Article 2(1) of the 1992 Constitution imposes on the Supreme Court the duty to measure the actions of both the legislature and the executive against the provision of the Constitution. This includes the duty to ensure that no public officer conduct himself in such a manner as to be in clear breach of the provisions of the Constitution. It is by actions of this nature that gives reality to enforcing the constitution by compelling its observance and ensuring probity, accountability and good governance.

The matter was recently put to rest by the unanimous decision of the Supreme Court in the unreported judgment of the Court in Emmanuel Noble Kor v Attorney-General and Another, Suit No. JI/16/2015 dated 10th March 2016 in which it was made explicitly clear as follows:-

It will be seen that article 2 of the Constitution is headed ‘Enforcement of the Constitution’ and the ensuing provisions are meant to attain the enforcement of the Constitution. There is therefore express authority in the Constitution itself for the view that the enforcement jurisdiction of this court is a conspicuously independent item of jurisdiction of this court. Indeed, though it will be erroneous to say that a declaratory action cannot be brought within article 2 towards the enforcement of an ambiguous provision of the Constitution, it appears that while the enforcement purpose of that article is clear on the face of its provisions, its interpretative purpose is comparatively latent.

Based on the above decisions and the principles of law decided therein, we have no doubts whatsoever in our minds that the plaintiffs have properly invoked the original jurisdiction of this court, and this court must therefore give them a hearing in line with the principles of law stated therein.

The objection on grounds of jurisdiction is thus dismissed.

This then requires us to consider the two issues set out in the memorandum of issues.


The Constitutional and Statutory mandate of the Auditor-General in respect of the public accounts of Ghana as defined in article 187(2) of the Constitution are well stated not only in the Constitution, but also in the Audit Service Act, 2000 (Act 584) and the Public Financial Management Act, 2016 (Act 921) respectively.

For example, the constitutional obligations of the Auditor-General include the following:-

(1) to audit and report on the public accounts of Ghana and of all public offices. – Article 187(2)
(2) to within six months after the end of the financial year prepare a report of his audit and lay same before Parliament drawing attention to any irregularities in the accounts audited and to any other matter which in his opinion ought to be brought to the notice of Parliament reference. – Article 187(5).
(3) to audit any public office upon the request of the President acting with the advice of the council of State reference. – Article 187(8).
(4) to exercise his Disallowance and Surcharge obligations in respect of irregularities he discovers in the performance of his functions under the Constitution or any other law. – Article 187(7)(b).

It is to be noted that, these constitutional obligations even though exist separately, some can only be triggered by the performance of others. For example the Auditor-General must conduct an audit into the public accounts of Ghana before he can prepare a report to Parliament. Similarly, there must also be an audit by the Auditor-General into the public accounts before there can be any Disallowance and or Surcharge.

However, it is possible for the Auditor-General to perform the audit into the public accounts of Ghana, prepare a report and lay same before Parliament without any irregularities detected. But it is not automatic that there must be a Disallowance and Surcharge arising from every such report. These are only triggered when the report discloses irregularities in the public accounts audited.

Thus, the constitutional obligation in Article 187(7) on the Auditor-General to exercise his mandate of Disallowance and Surcharge in the manner stated are only invoked against those persons responsible for incurring the liabilities which have led to the occurrence of the events listed in Articles 187(7)(b)(i), (ii) and (iii) supra of the constitution.

Furthermore, if we consider the statutory interventions in Acts 584 and 921, then it becomes very clear that the Auditor-General’s constitutional mandate in auditing the public accounts of Ghana far exceeds the task of auditing and pointing out the irregularities in the accounts of a public entity.

When one considers in detail, the effect of section 20(2) of Act 584 referred to, elsewhere in this rendition, then it becomes crystal clear that the Auditor-General, quite apart from conducting an audit into the public accounts of Ghana and preparing a report for Parliament and drawing attention to irregularities, and the matters stated therein, must definitely trigger his powers of Disallowance and Surcharge obligations, whenever these irregularities exist.

We are therefore of the considered view that the statement by the learned Counsel for the Defendants that, section 17 of Act 584 only mandates the Auditor-General to issue management letters as indicated in exhibits AG1 to AG4 is untenable.

This is because, a careful reading of section 17 of Act 584 referred to supra, gives very clear indications that the provisions therein stated are to be procedural steps that the Auditor-General is mandated to pursue in his quest to fulfill the Discharge and Surcharge obligations imposed upon him under the Constitution.

What is worthy of note is that, the 4th Republican Constitution has been anchored on the principles of Freedom, Justice, Probity and Accountability and the recognition that the powers of government spring from the sovereign will of the people based on the concept of universal adult suffrage and rooted on the principle of Rule of Law, the protection and preservation of fundamental human rights among others as stated in the preamble to the Constitution.

When we juxtapose these principles against the powers of the Auditor-General in Article 187(7)(b) and Acts 584 and 921 respectively, it becomes very clear that adequate measures have been put in place to afford any person against whom the Attorney-General has exercised his powers of surcharge and disallowance to avail himself of the due processes in the High Court to vindicate himself, whilst at the same time ensuring that the public accounts of the state are duly protected.

That fundamental right in section 17(3)p of Act 584 which enables an aggrieved person against whom a Disallowance and Surcharge had been made by the Auditor-General to within 60 days appeal to the High Court is in itself a recognition of the fact that, failure by an aggrieved person to take those steps can lead to the disallowance and surcharge being enforced without more. This enforcement can lead to the attainment of the principles of probity and accountability enshrined in the Constitution.

We are further emboldened by the views we have expressed in this judgment when we refer to the views of the then Auditor-General in Exhibit OG2, attached to these proceedings which are the proposals of the Auditor-General for amendment of the Constitutional provisions of the office of the Auditor-General.

For example on page 16 of the proposals, under the heading Issues and Comments are the following:-

The provisions of Article 187(7)(a) & (b) should be maintained and enforced.

The independence of the Auditor-General from the direction or control of any person or authority is a key requirement under INTOSAI’s Auditing standards. The office of the Auditor-General has received adverse comments from Development Partners who have invested in the national budget and also from Parliament for not actively introducing measures to implement the provisions on surcharge and disallowance.

From the above, it is clear that the Auditor-General has recognized the need to maintain and enforce the provisions in Article 187(7)(a) & (b) supra and also implement and enforce the provisions on surcharge and disallowance.

There is also a tacit recognition by the Auditor-General that the provisions on disallowance and surcharge must be maintained. The problem if any is the erroneous impression in the mind of the then Auditor-General that the said powers are discretionary in nature and that perhaps that he needed more legislation to carry out this disallowance and surcharge mandate. If this be it, then it is untenable.

The memorandum to the Interpretation Act, 2009 (Act 792) states in part as follows:-

In essence the Constitution must be construed or interpreted in a manner
(a) that promotes the rule of law and the values of good governance,
(b) that advances human rights and fundamental freedoms
that permits the creative development of the provisions of the Constitution and the Laws of Ghana, and
(c) that avoids technicalities which defeat the purpose of the Constitution and of the ordinary law of the land.

The Chambers, 21st Century Dictionary, Revised Edition, defines “disallow” on page 379 as follows:-

verb – to formally refuse to allow or accept something (2) to judge something to be invalid – disallowance – noun.

The same dictionary on page 142 defines “surcharge” as follows:-

an extra charge, often as a penalty for late payment of a bill.

When we consider the meanings ascribed to these words in the context in which they have been used in article 187(7)(b) of the Constitution then there seems to be no doubt whatsoever that, what the words actually mean is that, the Auditor-General will formally refuse to accept or allow any item of expenditure that is contrary to law etc.

Having refused to accept or allow the expenditure as being contrary to law, the Auditor-General now proceeds to impose an extra charge as penalty for the retrieval of the amount or expenditure that he has refused to allow or accept, because it was contrary to law.

Furthermore, Article 34(1) which deals with the Directive Principles of State Policy provide thus:-

The Directive Principles of State Policy contained in this chapter, shall guide all citizens, Parliament, the President, the Judiciary the Council of State, the Cabinet, political parties and other bodies and persons in applying or interpreting this Constitution or any other law and in taking or implementing any policy decisions, for the establishment of a just and free society.

The above provisions are a clear injunction on the Judiciary to bear the above in mind when interpreting the Constitution. There is thus no room for us as a Judiciary to be pedantic in dealing with issues of constitutional interpretation. This is especially so when in Article 37(1) of the Constitution, (which also includes the provisions on the Directive Principles of State Policy). It is directed that, “the state shall endeavour to secure and protect a social order founded on the ideals and principles of freedom, equality, justice, probity and accountability as enshrined in chapter 5 of this Constitution.”

All constitutional interpretations must therefore bear the above provisions in mind. This is especially so when we consider provisions requiring compliance with upholding of the tenets of probity and accountability vis-à-vis the work of the Auditor-General in protecting the public purse for the public good.

On the basis of the above, the nature of the Constitution as the basic law of the land and therefore requiring pride of place has been recognized in Article 11(1) of the Constitution.

At this stage, it is useful to refer and remind ourselves of the fact that the Constitution itself in Article 11(1)(a) has given pride of place to the Constitution as the Grundnorm, that is to say it is at the apex, of the laws of Ghana. This therefore means that the constitutional provisions in Article 187(7)(b) take precedence over any other laws, and must therefore be regarded in that position.

In our opinion therefore, the mandate of the Auditor-General in exercising his constitutional obligations in Article 187(7) of the Constitution does not end simply by the performance of same and issuing a report on the irregularities in the accounts of a public entity, but goes beyond it to include the powers of Disallowance and Surcharge which we will consider next.


We have been persuaded by the submissions of both learned counsel for the parties herein that, apart from the constitutional provisions in Article 187(7)(b) supra, which is applicable to the circumstances of this case, the other relevant statutes are sections 17(1) of Act 584 supra and sections 85(1) and 88(1) respectively of the Public Financial Management Act, 2016 (Act 921) which provides as follows:-

85. (1) A Principal Spending Officer shall, on an annual basis, submit the following to the Minister and Auditor-General:
(a) a report on the status of implementation of recommendations made by the Auditor-General in respect of that covered entity; and
(b) a report on the status of implementation of recommendations made by Parliament in respect of that covered entity.
(2) The Attorney-General shall, on an annual basis, submit a report on the status of any action commenced on behalf of the Government to the Minister, Auditor-General and Parliament following findings of the Auditor-General and recommendations of the Public Accounts Committee of Parliament.

88. (1) An Audit Committee shall ensure that the head of a covered entity, to which the Audit Committee relates,
(a) pursues the implementation of any recommendation contained in
(i) an internal audit report;
(ii) Parliament’s decision on the Auditor-General’s report;
(iii) Auditor-General’s Management Letter; and
(iv) the report of an internal monitoring unit in the covered entity concerned particularly, in relation to financial matters raised; and
(b) prepares an annual statement showing the status of implementation of any recommendation contained in
(i) an internal audit report;
(ii) Parliament’s decision on the Auditor-General’s report;
(iii) Auditor-General’s Management letter;
(iv) the report on financial matters raised in an internal monitoring unit of a covered entity; and
(v) any other related directive of Parliament.
(2) An annual statement required under subsection (1) (b) shall
(a) indicate the remedial action taken or proposed to be taken to avoid or minimise the recurrence of an undesirable feature in the accounts and operations of a covered entity;
(b) indicate the period for the completion of the remedial action; and
(c) be endorsed by the relevant sector Minister and forwarded to the Minister, Parliament, Office of the President and the Auditor-General within six months after the end of each financial year.

A perusal of the Constitutional provisions in Article 187(7)(b) and statutory provisions referred to supra, makes it quite clear that the bifurcated or two-pronged enforcement regime argument put up by the Plaintiffs in their statement of case is not only borne out by the relevant provisions referred to supra, but also prudent, designed to the encouragement of probity and accountability in the management of public accounts.

In the first procedure, the public entity against whom the irregularity has been made is required to take steps to collect or retrieve the amount from the person who incurred the liability and has been surcharged.

The second stage is where the person surcharged does not pay the amount and the provisions in section 17 of Act 584 supra are triggered.

As already stated supra, section 17(1) of Act 584 stipulates that it is to the head of the public entity that the Auditor-General shall specify the requirement to collect any amount due from the person on whom a surcharge or disallowance has been made and the reasons therein contained.

As stated supra, the roadmap that is envisaged by the section 17(1) provision of Act 584 has been indicated. This roadmap has recently been given a further boost by the enactment of the High Court (Civil Procedure) (Amendment) No. 2 Rules, 2016 (C. I. 102) which are Rules of procedure enacted by the Rules of Court Committee to further amend the High Court (Civil Procedure) Rules, 2004 (C. I. 47) by the insertion after Order 54 of the following new Order on “Disallowance and Surcharge Appeals).” The enactment of C. I. 102 makes it quite certain that the powers of the Auditor-General under Article 187(7) of the Constitution are to retrieve from persons who have caused loss of public funds in their management of same which is contrary to law. The law speaks for itself and there can be no turning back on this.

However, where the person surcharged files an appeal, Order 54A rule 2(7) and (8) of C. I. 47 constitutes the Auditor-General into the respondent to the appeal, as follows:-

For the purposes of the appeal, the Auditor-General is the respondent.

This makes it quite apparent that, following the Auditor-General’s exercise of the Disallowance and Surcharge, the bifurcated approach is triggered. It should also be noted that, there can be no such bifurcated approach to retrieve the sums of money so specified unless and until there has been a disallowance and surcharge.

Furthermore, section 88(1) and (2) of Act 921 puts the matter beyond doubt by stipulating the various steps that the head of the entity covered is expected to take in order to ensure the implementation of the Auditor-General’s recommendations as contained in his management reports and final report on financial matters.

Section 85(1)(a) and (b) on the other hand directs the Principal spending officer to submit on an annual basis, the following:-

(1) A report on the status of the implementation of the Auditor-General’s report.
(2) A report on the status of the implementation of the report of the Auditor-General made by Parliament in respect of the entity covered.

In our considered opinion, in interpreting the constitutional provisions referred to in Article 187(7)(b)(i), (ii) and (iii) supra, we also have a duty to look at all the subordinate legislations which have been enacted to practicalise the harmonious effect of the constitutional provisions. These include the following:-

(1) Audit Service Act, 2000 (Act 584)
(2) Audit Service Regulations, 2011 (C.I. 70)
(3) Public Financial Management Act, 2016 (Act 921)
(4) High Court (Civil Procedure) (Amendment) No. 2 Rules, 2016 (C.I. 102)

Perusal of the relevant sections of Act 584 and 921 supra, and the overriding philosophical underpinnings of the 4th Republican Constitution in its preamble, make it quite clear that the said constitutional provision on the powers of Disallowance and Surcharge of the Attorney-General must be enforced.

We reckon the fact that, the stipulations in articles 187(2), (3), (4), (5) and (6) of the Constitution has the operative word “shall”, and this is mandatory.

However, when it comes to the vexed issue of the Disallowance and Surcharge, provisions as used in Article 187(7)(b) the operative word is “may”.

Taking a cue from the importance of the work that is attached to the office of the Auditor-General and the fact that it is the custodian and protector of the public purse, any derogation of the functions therein specified will defeat the lofty aims and objectives stated in the Preamble to the Constitution and the role and objectives of the work of the Auditor-General.

It is to be noted that, the general rules for construction or interpretation that we have become so familiar with were formulated by Judges and crystalised into rules and principles of interpretation.

See for example the mischief rule which was enunciated in Heydon’s case [1584] 3 Co. Rep 7a76 E.R. 637, the Literal Rule which was propounded in the Sussex Peerage case [1844] 11 Co. & E 85, 8 E.R. 1034, the Golden Rule enunciated in the Grey v Pearson [1857] 6. H.L.C 61, 10 E.R. 1216.

The courts in the commonwealth then moved to the now in vogue Purposive Approach. Judges in Ghana and elsewhere in the Commonwealth, have where it is considered appropriate abandoned the strict constructionist view of interpretation in favour of the purposive approach to interpretation which per Atuguba JSC in his opinion in Re Presidential Election Petition, Akufo-Addo & 2 others (No. 4) v Mahama & 2 Others (No. 4) 2013 SCGLR (Special Edition) 73 at page 111 where he stated that

the purposive approach has been enthroned in the Supreme Court as the dominant rule for the construction of the Constitution.

See also the Supreme Court case of Agyei Twum v Attorney-General & Akwetey [2005-2006] SCGLR 732 at 757 where the court adopted the purposive approach to interpretation of the Constitution.

See also Ransford France No. 3 v Electoral Commission & Attorney-General [2012] 1 SCGLR 705 at 718 where the court rejected a literal interpretation that was urged upon it in favour of a purposive approach claiming that a literal interpretation would lead to grave injustice.

It is in this respect that we feel the entire provisions of Articles 187 to 189 on the Auditor-General and the Audit Service must be read as a whole. If that is done, then the intended effect of the work of the Auditor-General which is to ensure that public funds or accounts are handled by safe hands, and that whenever losses of any kind contemplated in Article 187(7)(b) occur, those responsible are identified and duly punished. This must be measured against the background of the fact that the practicalisation of the work of the Auditor-General will ensure that there is probity and accountability in the management of state funds. This will no doubt prevent the wanton dissipation of state resources that are meant for specific projects and activities under the Government’s fiscal policies.

This therefore means that there should be no loss to the state or public in the management of state resources.

At this moment, we think judicial notice can be taken of the fact that corruption, abuse of position and embezzlement of public funds among others has become the bane of our governance structures. Reference is made to the various Auditor-General’s Reports attached to these proceedings. It is our opinion that, notice must be taken of the rampant carelessness that is often times employed by those in charge of public funds in most entities.

We believe that the time has come when it is necessary to strengthen the relevant constitutional bodies set up under the Constitution such as the Auditor-General to protect the public purse from persons who intend to embark upon personal economic recovery programmes with the public funds.

We are also of the view that, the Auditor-General is expected to name the persons who commit irregularities etc, under Article 187(7)(b) and section 17 of Act 584 respectively, recover the amounts from them and thereafter those persons be made to face appropriate punishment. That should be the way forward.

We therefore have a duty to ensure that the reports of the Auditor-General into the public accounts of Ghana wherein findings are made in respect of persons who act in authorizing expenditure contrary to law, or have withheld sums of money from the public account or by whose negligence or misconduct losses or deficiencies to public funds has resulted, must be treated in accordance with the Constitution and laws of Ghana, and have an immediate impact.

“To be or not to be, that is the question,” reference Shakespeare in Hamlet, Prince of Denmark.

Should this court hold and rule that, because the word “may” has been used in Article 187(7)(b) of the Constitution 1992, the Auditor-General’s powers of surcharge and disallowance are not mandatory and can be exercised at the whims and caprices of the Auditor-General? Are these constitutional obligations discretionary then?

We have been privileged to have been given access to the training materials used by the Auditor-General on March 23rd 2006 in a presentation by the then Auditor-General Mr. Edward Dua Agyemang, at a seminar on public accounts management, among others, on the topic “Public Expenditure Monitoring and Tracking – The Role of the Auditor-General” attached to these proceedings as Exhibit OG1.

We find these materials quite appropriate, and revealing. Since they also conflict with the stance of the Defendants in these proceedings, we deem it appropriate to refer to some of them as per Exhibit OG1.

Powers of surcharge and approval of systems

In the course of monitoring public expenditure, the Auditor-General has been given a unique power of surcharge by the Constitution and the Audit Service Act. Article 187(7)(b) of the Constitution requires that the Auditor-General may disallow any item of expenditure, which is contrary to law and surcharge.

Any person against whom a surcharge has been raised by the Auditor-General has the power of appeal against the surcharge in the High Court.

So far this power has not been invoked against public officials because they are given the opportunity to rectify financial lapses resulting in delayed accountability.

However, because of the escalation in cash irregularities by 99.5% in 2004 involving presented payments vouchers and unacquitted payments, the Auditor-General will invoke his powers of surcharge against responsible officers for such serious compliance violations in 2006. This robust sanction will hasten and deepen accountability in the country.

The combined effect of the above is that, as at March 2006, the office of the Auditor-General recognized the fact that the way to protect the public funds of Ghana, and prevent looting of the public purse, avoid corruption and dictatorship is to practicalise the constitutional provisions on the powers of surcharge and disallowance, granted the Auditor-General under the Constitution 1992.

However, this resolve to exercise this power from 2006 has not only been breached, but there has been stoic silence from the office of the Auditor-General to date.

We do not substitute the views of the Auditor-General in those presentations for our constitutional mandate in interpreting and enforcing the constitutional provisions in Article 187(7)(b) as we are required to do. We have only done the references in order to let it be known that, this was the thinking of the Auditor-General in 2006 on these vexed issues.

We also wish to refer to the locus classicus case of Tuffour v Attorney-General [1980] GLR 637. Even though the facts of this case are well known, suffice it to be stated briefly as follows:-

The Plaintiff therein, filed a writ against the Speaker and Attorney General under Section 3 of the first Schedule to the Constitution 1979 for a declaration as follows:-

(1) On the coming into force of the Constitution the Hon. Mr. Justice Apaloo was deemed to have been appointed as Chief Justice and also as President and member of the Supreme Court.
(2) The application of the procedure in article 127(1) to him and his purported vetting and rejection by Parliament were in contravention of the Constitution.
(3) That Justice Apaloo remained Chief Justice and President of the Supreme Court.

Sowah JSC (as he then was) in delivering the judgment of the court, made some pronounced and notable statements regarding the nature of a written constitution such as this 4th Republican Constitution and how it also mirrors the history of the people of Ghana. Out of abundance of caution, we wish to refer to the relevant portions of that judgment.

This has been done with a view to illustrating how Constitutional provisions can be interpreted to achieve the special architecture designed to ensure a proper equilibrium in the governance structure aimed at probity, accountability and transparency. Without these values, all is vanity in our quest for a control mechanism of our public funds or accounts. He states:-

A written Constitution such as ours is not an ordinary Act of Parliament. It embodies the will of a people. It also mirrors their history. Account, therefore, needs to be taken of it as a landmark in a people’s search for progress. It contains within it their aspirations and their hopes for a better and fuller life.

The Constitution has its letter of the law. Equally, the Constitution has its spirit. It is the fountain-head for the authority which each of the three arms of government possesses and exercises. It is a source of strength. It is a source of power. The executive, the legislature and the judiciary are created by the Constitution. Their authority is derived from the Constitution. Their sustenance is derived from the Constitution. Its methods of alteration are specified. In our peculiar circumstances, these methods require the involvement of the whole body politic of Ghana. Its language, therefore, must be considered as if it were a living organism capable of growth and development. Indeed, it is a living organism capable of growth and development, as the body politic of Ghana itself is capable of growth and development. A broad and liberal spirit is required for its interpretation. It does not admit of a narrow interpretation. A doctrinaire approach to interpretation would not do. We must take account of its principles and bring that consideration to bear, in bringing it into conformity with the needs of the time. And so we must take cognisance of the age-old fundamental principle of constitutional construction which gives effect to the intent of the framers of this organic law. Every word has an effect. Every part must be given effect. Perhaps it would not be out of place to remember the injunction of St. Paul contained in his First Epistle to the Corinthians, Chapter 12, verses 14-20 (King James Version):

‘For the body is not one member, but many. If the foot shall say, Because I am not the hand, I am not of the body; is it therefore not of the body? And if the ear shall say, Because I am not the eye, I am not of the body; is it therefore not of the body? If the whole body were an eye, where were the hearing ? If the whole were hearing, where were the smelling…? But now are they many members, yet but one body.’

And so a construction should be avoided which leads to absurdity. And when a particular interpretation leads to two, shall we say “inconsistent” results, the spirit of the Constitution would demand that the more reasonable of the two should be adhered to. We must have recourse to the Constitution as a whole.

When we put all the learning in the above quotation together, the “may” in Article 187(7)(b) of the Constitution 1992, becomes a mandatory may, and no longer permissive. This is to afford us the opportunity to enforce the provisions of Article 187(7)(b) which will deepen probity and accountability.

It is to be noted that the times we are in as a nation require that we deepen and institutionalize principles which will uphold proper and decent management and protection of public accounts. The tendency where public accounts are considered as a fattened cow to be milked by all and sundry must stop. Our laws on financial management must therefore be made to work to prevent absurdity in our enforcement regimes of same.

We reckon that, it is in the pursuance of these noble objectives that the Rules of Court Committee has enacted C. I. 70 and also C.I. 102 both referred to supra.

The rationale for the above is to give teeth to the constitutional and statutory mandate of the Auditor-General’s powers on Disallowance and Surcharge to bite.

In their respective submissions, learned counsel have variously referred to and relied on Audit observations and management letters.

In essence, whilst the Defendants concede that the Auditor-General has this constitutional power or mandate of surcharge and disallowance, they argue that, the duty of the Auditor-General ends with the submission of his report. They contend further that, action on the Auditor-General’s reports are to be implemented by other statutory bodies. These are the Audit Committee’s established under the Public Financial Management Act, 2016 (Act 921), section 85 (1) of which deals with the report and recommendations of the Auditor-General by the principal spending officer of that entity in relation to his dealings with the Auditor-General and Parliament respectively.

On the other hand, sections 86 to 88 of Act 921 deals with the Establishment of Audit Committees by various entities, the composition of the membership of such committee’s and the functions of the said Audit Committees respectively.

Section 88(1) of Act 921 has already been referred to supra. The crux of the provisions therein contained indicate that, in all cases;
(1) The Audit Committees are to pursue the implementation of any recommendation contained inter alia, in the Auditor-Generals report, as decided upon by Parliament, and the Auditor-General’s management letter and
(2) To prepare an annual statement showing the status of implementation of any recommendation contained in the Auditor-General’s report on
(a) Parliament’s decision on the Auditor-General’s report and
(b) Auditor-General’s management letter, among others.

What is to be noted is that, all the above requirements and procedures are statutory, based on Acts 584 and 921 respectively as well as the Audit Service Regulations, 2011 respectively. However, the Auditor-General’s powers of surcharge and disallowance are constitutional and therefore have to be on a higher pedestal and given pride of place.

When we consider the combined effect of Regulations 34, 35, and 57 respectively of the Audit Service Regulations, 2011 (C I. 70), which deals with Audit observations and reporting, consequences of not responding to an audit observation and issue of management letters after completion of an audit assignment respectively, it becomes very clear that these roles and functions are different in scope and magnitude from the Auditor-General’s report envisaged and stipulated in Articles 187(2) and (5) respectively of the constitution.

Whilst management letters are issued by Branch and sectoral heads within two weeks of an audit assignment, containing their findings, recommendations and conclusions of their assignment to the management of the entity and copied to the officials and the organisations, that of the Auditor-General is wider in scope as it is submitted to Parliament and has far reaching effects and consequences as is stipulated in Articles 187(7)(b) of the Constitution.

Audit observations per Regulation 34(1) of C.I. 70 on the other hand are formal audit observations issued at an audit location in the course of the audit. In this respect, the audit team is enjoined under Regulation 34(2)(a) & (b) of C.I. 70 to take steps to discuss with the audited organization the findings and recommendations arising from the audit and also obtain written responses from the audited organization. Thus these activities occur at a lower level and earlier stage of the process which culminated in the Auditor-General’s report submitted to Parliament.

It is thus therefore quite clear that Audit observations, and Management letters are different in context, scope and magnitude from the Auditor-Generals’ report as stipulated in Article 187 referred to supra.

From the above discussions, it is quite apparent that the Auditor-General has an obligation to ensure that his powers of disallowance and surcharge duly exercised by him under Article 187(7)(b) of the Constitution are complied with by the public entity or officials directly affected by the exercise of his powers of surcharge and disallowance.


In the premises, it is our considered view that using the principles of interpretation so eloquently and powerfully explained in the decision in the case of Tuffour v Attorney-General, supra and the purposive approach to interpretation generally, this court will interprete Article 187(7)(b) as having a mandatory effect in so far as the Auditor-General’s report is final.

In the premises, the Plaintiffs succeed in their claims against the Defendants in respect of reliefs 1, 2, and 3 as follows:-

(1) That upon a true and proper interpretation of Article 187(7)(b)(i) of the Constitution, the Auditor-General is bound to issue a disallowance or surcharge where there has been any item of expenditure on behalf of the Government that is contrary to law.
(2) That upon a true and proper interpretation of Article 187(7)(b)(ii) of the Constitution, the Auditor-General is bound to issue a disallowance and surcharge where any person fails to bring any sum into the Government’s account.
(3) That upon a true and proper interpretation of Article 187(7)(b)(iii) of the Constitution, the Auditor-General is bound to issue a disallowance and surcharge where the Government suffers or incurs a loss or deficiency through the negligence or misconduct of any person.

Reliefs 4 and 5 are granted in their entirety against the Defendants.


As a sequel to our judgment just delivered, we further direct that, henceforth, the Auditor-General shall take steps to recover the amount unlawfully expended from the person or persons who incurred and or authorised the disallowed expenditure.

Secondly, the Auditor-General shall also take steps to recover the amount from the person or persons by whom the amount ought to have been brought into account.

Thirdly, the Auditor-General shall also take steps to recover the value of the loss or deficiency from the person or persons by whose negligence or misconduct the losses or deficiencies were incurred, (whether or not the person is a public servant).

Finally, the Attorney-General is hereby ordered to take all necessary steps to enforce the decisions or steps taken by the Auditor-General supra to ensure compliance including in some cases criminal prosecutions.

We have had to issue out the above consequential orders even though we are happily aware that the current Auditor-General Mr. Daniel Yao Domelevo has taken steps to train his staff under C. I. 102 to prepare them adequately for the hearings in respect of the surcharge and disallowance appeals anticipated under article 187 (7) of the Constitution.


Quoting again from the presentation by the then Auditor-General, Mr. Edward Dua Agyemang, attached to these proceedings by the Plaintiffs as exhibit OG1, which we have already referred to supra, the Auditor-General concluded that presentation as follows:-

Let me conclude by saying that whenever people get a choice between privacy and accountability, they tend to choose privacy for themselves and accountability for everyone else. But accountability and good governance are inextricably interrelated with each other. Take away accountability from good governance and you will be left with dictatorship and corruption.

For accountability to thrive there is the need to have effective monitoring and tracking of public expenditure by the Auditor-General. The success in this endeavor depends on strong political will to adequately resource the Auditor-General to be able to hire and maintain properly trained staff and professionals; acquire the needed equipment and other resources.

The growing interest of the public in the work of the Auditor-General has demonstrated the important contribution the Auditor-General makes in helping our nation spend wisely through expenditure surveillance. The Auditor-General provides assurances to the people of Ghana through Parliament that public money is spent properly and that there is accountability.

From the above, what is apparent is that, there is an urgent need to adequately resource not only the office of the Auditor-General, but also that of the other constitutional bodies like the Judiciary, CHRAJ and Attorney-General, just to mention a few, who are the front runners in our fight against corruption. This will ensure that the impact of these constitutional bodies in our quest to ensure probity and accountability thereby enhancing proper management and control of public funds is put on a higher pedestal.

We believe that as a nation, we have reached a critical stage in our governance systems where we must not shy away from spending wisely in order to superintend the public purse. This is the only sure way to ensure that the good governance principles enshrined in the Constitution such as Article 187(7)(b) are not lost.

There is an old adage which states as follows “penny wise, pound foolish”. We therefore must adequately fund these constitutional bodies including the Auditor-General to ensure maximum protection of the public funds.

Save as is stated supra, the Plaintiffs succeed substantially on their claims against the Defendants.








OccupyGhana® Condemns The Lynching Of Captain Maxwell Adam Mahama By A Mob In Denkyira-Obuasi

OccupyGhana® Condemns The Lynching Of Captain Maxwell Adam Mahama By A Mob In Denkyira-Obuasi

It is alleged that in the early morning hours of May 29, 2017, one Captain Maxwell Adam Mahama went jogging along a road in Denkyira-Obuasi, in the Upper Denkyira West District of the Central region. He belonged to the 5th Infantry Battalion (5BN) at Burma Camp in Accra but was stationed in Denkyira-Obuasi where he commanded a detachment of soldiers officially deployed for duties in the Upper Wassa Forest Reserve. It is alleged that he wore a pistol in a holster as he ran. Allegedly, a woman who saw him mistakenly assumed he was an armed robber. It is further alleged that there had been a robbery in the town recently, and so she alerted others who organized a mob. Whatever the truth is, this poor captain was attacked by the mob from the town. He was stoned to death and his body set on fire. He died ignominiously. We have seen videos circulating on social media that purports to record aspects of this horrific incident.

We at OccupyGhana® wish to extend our condolences to his family, the wife and children he has left behind and the Ghana Armed Forces for this loss.

It was not too long ago when the ire of the nation was raised over a young woman being stripped naked and abused by a mob in Kumasi. The woman was allegedly caught attempting to steal GH¢1,100 from a shop owner in the PZ Area in Adum, Kumasi, an allegation that later was found to be false.

The practice of mob justice is unfortunately a rather dark side of our country’s history and does not seem to want to go away. It is unconstitutional, barbaric, unjust, unfair and criminal, and often has fatal consequences, as was the case of Captain Mahama. It often ensnares the innocent and deprives law enforcement of the chance to thoroughly investigate cases. Moreover, it denies victims due process and constitutes an abuse of their human rights and violation of their dignity.  And, our Constitution demand respect of the right to life and outlaws all extra-judicial killing.

The brutal murder of the Captain exhibits a certain depravity and wanton disregard for the sanctity of human life that leaves a rather deep stain on our nation. Should his life not have mattered more than the wish to mete out justice beside the road somewhere in Denkyira? Should we not always put life first?

This dastardly act also exposes a dire lack of appreciation of what human rights and dignity are. The perpetrators of this heinous crime may have mirrored our nation and its people’s sore lack of knowledge, understanding and appreciation of these basic human entitlements.

Reports indicate that the Captain was in the Denkyira area as part of the military’s “Operation Calm Life” involving fight armed robbery and illegal small-scale mining or galamsey, twin scourges that are plaguing our dear nation. Is it not ironic and tragic that in his quest to fight these plagues, he fell to another? Is our nation so infested with the wrong and nefarious that good people are now falling victim as they seek to serve this great nation?

We as a people should hang our collective heads in shame for this despicable act.

It behoves us all to lend our voice in calling for a thorough investigation into this rank act. It is incumbent on all of us to not rest until the actors in the morbid killing of Captain Mahama are found, arrested and prosecuted to the full extent of the law. We as Ghanaians should stand up against mob justice whenever and wherever it happens. It is high time that this malignant and festering cancer is rooted out of our civil society that is quickly turning uncivil. Further, we all need to remind ourselves that each of us is endowed with unalienable human rights and dignity that is buttressed by our Constitution and that we all need to respect those rights as it pertains to ourselves and to others. Then and only then will God bless this homeland Ghana and make us great and strong.

Yours, in the perpetual Service of God & Country


OccupyGhana® Condemns Sexist Action Against Pregnant Nursing Student

OccupyGhana® Condemns Sexist Action Against Pregnant Nursing Student

12th May, 2017



OccupyGhana® is shocked and dismayed at the news that a nursing student at the Gusheigu Midwifery Training School was on Wednesday 10th April 2017, prevented from writing an exam because she was 4 months pregnant.

This unconstitutional practice, which has gone on for years, is apparently based on a rule in the student handbook in our Nursing and Midwifery Training Schools. The rule demands that pregnant women defer their courses while those who abort their pregnancies are dismissed (Daily Graphic, May 28 2016)

It is regrettable that pregnancy discrimination persists, even though CHRAJ declared as illegal, the barring of pregnant students from writing exams in a case involving the same Nurses and Midwifery Council just last year.

We unequivocally condemn this sexist, archaic and totally unacceptable practice and emphasise that pregnancy must not be a barrier to the education of women. It is in clear violation of the Constitution’s anti-discrimination provisions.

We note that the Nursing and Midwifery Council has condemned the action of the Principal and we expect that this will be immediately followed by the strongest possible sanctions to serve as a deterrent to other schools. In addition we would fully support the student, Mrs. Cecilia Awuni, should she decide to seek legal redress.

Yours in the service of occupying minds for God and Country